It was a—how do you call it in English?—a genocide? Yes? It was a
genocide,” says Murat Yazar. “My grandmother told my mother about it.”
My walking guide and I are wandering through Ani.
What is Ani? It is the ruin of a vanished world in modern Turkey: the
remote and beautiful site of a forgotten civilization—the
1,100-year-old capital of a once powerful empire. Relics of this Silk
Road city lie scattered across the sky-hammered mesas of far
northeastern Anatolia. Broken cathedrals. Rotting ramparts that defend
nothing from nothing. Empty boulevards that go nowhere. We roam this
colossal diorama of stillness, of eerie silence, Murat and I, as if
painted into a Dali dreamscape. We are talking about the disappearance of Armenians from the region.
Broken arch: a relic of ancient Ani on the closed Turkey-Armenia border. Photograph by Paul Salopek
In 1914, about two million Armenians lived in what is today Turkey.
They were a Christian minority under Muslim rule. Their history reached
back thousands of years. By 1922, just 400,000 remained.
What happened to more than 1.5 million people? Most were killed,
historians say. They were targeted for extermination. They were marched
into waterless deserts at bayonet point. They were slaughtered.
“My grandmother said they locked all the Armenians near the Euphrates
River into some houses,” Murat tells me. “Then they took them out at
night and pushed them into the river. They drowned them.”
It was eight months into World War I. Europe had begun to cannibalize
itself. The multicultural Ottoman Empire was dying in terrible spasms.
The Ottoman Turkish majority—whipped up by nationalist leaders and
enraged by the mass deportations and massacres carried out by former
Christian subjects against fellow Muslims in the crumbling fringes of
the state—wreaked revenge on their ancient neighbors: minority Assyrians
and Greeks, but mostly Armenians. They accused the Armenians of being
infidels. Of disloyalty. Of siding with the empire’s encroaching foes
(the Russians and colonial Europeans). The knife hand in this enormous
crime? Local Kurds. Kurds shot and hacked Armenians to death en masse.
Kurdish gangs tore into refugee columns of starving Armenian women and
children. Kurdish villagers seized Armenian property—abandoned farms,
flocks, and homes.
We have been walking through the dim echoes of this calamity, Murat
and I, all the way across Anatolia. We seek shade in derelict houses of
Armenians—homes overgrown with trees, with weeds. We pass sturdy
churches converted to mosques. We skirt walnut orchards planted long ago
by the victims. Murat broods about this. He is a Kurd. I see him
grappling with history, with a legacy he cannot imagine, with the
haunted landscape.
“Once, I apologized to an Armenian man in Istanbul,” he tells me. “I told him I was sorry for what my ancestors did.”
And how did the man react?
“What could he say?” Murat says, shrugging. “He said, ‘Thank you.’”
We stand in a cold wind. A big sign at the entrance to the
archaeological ruins of Ani describe its long story. The text states
that the ancient and sprawling metropolis flowered under Bagratian
kings. The Bagratians were Armenian. Nowhere is the word “Armenian”
written.
* * *
It has been dangerous for many years in Turkey to describe what occurred in 1915 as a genocide.
Turkish judges have deemed this term provocative, incendiary,
insulting, a taboo. Turkish writers and journalists who deploy those
three syllables can face charges of slander against the Turkish state.
One has been assassinated by ultra-nationalists.
There is an official version of events. It goes like this: The
Armenians suffered, this is undeniably true. Yet they were just one of
many ethnic groups who felt the heavy blows of the imploding Ottoman
Empire. Their destruction was neither extreme nor systematic. It was a
war. And violence coursed both ways: Armenians perished, but so did
Turks, at the hands of rebellious Armenian mobs. Yet this narrow reading
of history has begun to show some cracks. In April, Turkey’s then prime
minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, became the first Turkish leader to
express formal condolences to the descendants of Turkey’s Armenians, who
today live scattered across the globe. He spoke, carefully, of the two
peoples’ “shared pain.”
Walking through the Kurdish hinterlands of Anatolia, one senses that ordinary citizens are far ahead of him.
“We fought the Armenians, and many died,” says Saleh Emre, the
white-haired mayor of Kas Kale village. “I think this was wrong. They
belonged here.” Emre pauses. He sweeps a gnarled hand over the houses of
his tiny community. “This land used to be owned by an Armenian trader.
My father’s uncles bought it cheap.” He allows this detail to sink in.
Then he ticks off the names of nearby Turkish towns that once were
dominated by Armenians: Van, Patnos, Agri. No Armenians live there now.
He stops short of using the word genocide.
The old man peers east across rolling sunlit plains, across
brass-colored pastures, across grassy paradise blighted by memory,
toward the nearby country where some survivors fled. “I would like visit
to Armenia,” Emre says. “Armenians were our neighbors.”
* * *
The scene: a church courtyard in Diyarbakir, the cultural capital of Turkey’s Kurds.
Sourp Giragos is the largest Armenian church in the Middle East. It
is newly renovated, mostly with donations from the remnant Armenian
community in Istanbul. It is a monument to hope, to reconciliation, one
of a few such gestures taking root in the Kurdish zones of Anatolia in a
hundred years. (In a distant town called Bitlis, the Kurdish mayor has
named a street after William Saroyan, the Armenian-American writer.)
People bustle about under a massive bell tower. They are sweeping fallen
leaves. Serving coffee at outdoor tables. Chatting. Some light candles.
A few are Muslim. Most are Armenian Orthodox Christians. Aram
Khatchigian, a caretaker, has been both.
Until I was 15, I believed I was a Muslim, a Kurd,” Khatchigian says. “After that, I started to feel a change in my heart.”
He explains how he excavated his hidden past. How he learned that his
grandfather, a boy of 12, and his grandfather’s younger sister, a girl
of 9, were actually Armenian—the only ones in their immediate family to
survive the killing fields around Diyarbakir, where a “pungent smell of decaying corpses”
filled the air. The boy and girl hid under a bush until a Muslim
Kurdish farmer took them in, saving their lives, caring for them as his
own children, giving them his name. They converted to Islam. “All
Armenians still living did this,” Khatchigian says. “They would be
killed otherwise.” Then a man stalks up to our table. He has been
listening.
“Do you recognize the genocide?” he demands. He looks into my eyes.
I am conducting an interview, I tell him.
“I don’t care,” he says. “Do you or don’t you recognize the genocide?”
For some Armenians, this consuming question has become everything—the
lynchpin of a national struggle, almost of a modern identity: Turkey
and the world must finally acknowledge that a true genocide, legally
defined, unfolded in Anatolia. Vast amounts of energy and money are
poured into this lobbying campaign by millions of Armenians in the
diaspora. (At least 21 countries
now officially accept the Armenian genocide as fact. The United States
and Israel, valuing diplomatic ties with Turkey, aren’t among them.)
Armenian-American author Meline Tomani describes the suffocating effect of this bitter political debate on her life:
“To some Armenians, recognition means reparations from Turkey: to the
true zealots, land; to the slightly more pragmatic, money. To most, it
simply means the official usage of the word genocide. To me, it came to
mean that I could no longer stand to attend any Armenian gathering,
because it seemed that whether it was a poetry reading, a concert, or
even a sporting match, it was always, ultimately, about the genocide.”
At the church in Diyarbakir the stranger sits down at our table.
He repeats his question again. And again. Khatchigian stares down at his shoes, embarrassed. I lay down my pen. We wait.
A giant red Turkish flag flutters above the archaeological site at Ani.
The city’s ancient ruins toe the ledge of a canyon. On the other
side, within easy walking distance, lies the small Republic of Armenia.
Nobody ever crosses. The border between the two nations has been shut
for years by mutual suspicion and hostility. Ani is a dead end.
We strike out, Murat and I, heading due north.
We tug our brave cargo mule across sodden winter fields around Kars, a
Turkish city that in the 1890s was 85 percent Armenian. Murat asks its
startled residents if any Armenians yet remain. A Turkish citizen, and a
minority Kurd wrestling with his own questions of cultural endurance,
Murat always asks. I watch him plod head, interrogating the past for
answers. A lanky man, wistful, questing. With a camera slung over his
parka. Black Anatolian mud cakes under his boots. I can only shake my
head in wonder.
Killers or victims, there are no chosen people. There are simply
people. And the dead. And what you do with your pain tells the world who
you are.
STRASBOURG (A.W.)—The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held a Grand
Chamber hearing on Jan. 28, in the case of Dogu Perincek v.
Switzerland. The case stems from a Swiss court verdict that in 2007
fined Perincek, a Turkish ultranationalist activist and chairman of
Turkey’s Workers’ Party, over his 2005 statement calling the Armenian
Genocide an “international lie.” In appealing to the ECHR, Perincek’s
defense argued that the Swiss court violated Perincek’s right to freedom
of expression; the court ruled in their favor in 2013. On March 7,
2014, Switzerland filed an appeal, which led to today’s hearing.
The Armenian legal team was comprised of Armenia’s Prosecutor General
Gevorg Kostanyan, and attorneys Geoffrey Ronald Robertson and Amal
Alamuddin Clooney.
In his statements, Robertson said that Perincek is “a genocide denial
forum shopper,” and that “He seeks out countries in Europe where he can
be convicted and by so doing promote himself and his perverse view of
history.” Robertson also referred to Perincek as a “vexatious litigant”
and a “pest.” A mere ‘opinion’
Mehmet Cengiz, representing Dogu Perincek, presented before the court
first, and argued that Perincek’s motives were not of a racist nature,
but that his statements were in essence a legal assessment of the “1915
events.”
“Dr. Perincek made a legal assessment. He did not ignore the massacres and the deportations; he did not deny the actus reus
of the 1915 events. The dispute between the parties concerns the legal
definition of the tragic events that took place a hundred years ago in
the Ottoman Empire. Mr. Perincek defends that these events cannot be
defined as a crime of genocide. Perincek rejects the judicial
qualifications of the events as genocide and bases his opinions on the
1948 UN genocide convention,” said Cengiz, who also claimed that there
is no consensus on the genocide. “Mr. Perincek made similar statements
in both Germany and France and did not face similar charges,” he said.
Cengiz argued that Perincek had no racial motives, having spent his
life countering racism. “You can seek many motivations, many intents…
but even if you sought for 1,000 years, you won’t find a racist intent
because Dr. Perincek has spent his lifetime fighting against racism,
this is why he has served 14 years in prison… Take a look at his files:
in every case he fought against racism.”
Perincek, on the other hand, spoke about “Europe’s tradition and
heritage of liberty.” “Freedom of expression means liberty for
different, even deviating opinions, and freedom is needed for those who
oppose the status quo. If circulating opinions and prejudices cannot be
discussed then there is no freedom,” said Perincek, adding, “We need to
make sure we rid ourselves from the negative effects of judgements,
opinions, which dates back to the First World War. The consciousness,
the thinking of the Europeans about the event of 1915 should not be
surrounded and besieged by prohibitions. Let us secure the freedom to
access the truth.”
Perincek also spoke about “90 kilos” of documents that his team
submitted to the court as evidence in an attempt to prove why the
Armenian Genocide should not be labeled as such.
Perincek spoke about “the pain” he “shares” with the Armenian people,
while claiming that massacres and forced deportations were “mutual” in
the Ottoman Empire.
“Let us protect peace and brotherhood in Europe, in Turkey. The
accusation of the Armenian Genocide has turned into a taboo, it’s turned
into a tool to discriminate against Turkish people, to humiliate
Turks,” said Perincek, adding, “Today Turks and Muslims are the black
people of Europe. Let also the oppressed ones defend themselves.”
Until two days before the hearing, Perincek was under a travel ban
due to an ongoing Ergenekon related case against him. The Istanbul 4th
High Criminal Court lifted the travel ban on Jan. 26. “Now, the [next
step] is [for] the historical case in Strasbourg to finalize the lie of
Armenian genocide,” read a statement released by the socialist Workers’
Party, which Perincek chairs, reported Turkish sources.
Christian Laurent Pech, also representing Perincek, said the trial
was not about whether the proper characterization of what happened to
the Armenians in 1915 is genocide. “In these troubled times, we find it
important to recall that one of the main purposes of freedom of
expression is to protect opinions that might not be popular whether in
Switzerland, Turkey or elsewhere,” he said.
Stefan Talmon, representing the government of Turkey, argued that
Perincek was merely sharing an opinion, which is not the same as
targeting a certain group of people. “Calling something an
‘international lie’ is not the same as calling a certain group of
persons ‘liars,’ as such, it has no racial connotation,” said Talmon. A ‘well-reasoned’ judgment
Representing the government of Switzerland, Frank Schurmann laid out
reasons why his government believes that the Swiss court handed down
“well-reasoned judgments reaching a perfectly justifiable result.” He
argued that the lower court in reaching its verdict ignored the context
in which Perincek’s statements were uttered. He forcefully argued that
victims of genocidal crimes, as well as their descendants, deserve to
have their rights legally protected from statements that were an assault
on their human dignity.
“It is not denial per se which warrants punishment, but the hate and
discriminatory intent that must also be present,” argued Schurmann. “Let
us also recall the applicant’s identification with Talaat Pasha, one of
the instigators of the fact in issue, found guilty by the court martial
of the Ottoman Empire,” he said, and cited the intervention offered to
the court in favor of Armenia by Turkish human rights organizations,
which helped further place Perincek’s statements into a larger context.
Professor Daniel Thurer also spoke on behalf of the Swiss government,
providing further arguments and in support of the Swiss court’s
position. Genocide denial can have ‘double impact’
Armenia’s Prosecutor General Gevorg Kostanyan presented the history
of the Armenian Genocide and introduced Geoffrey Robertson QC to address
the Grand Chamber. Robertson, who is representing Armenia on behalf of
Doughty Street Chambers along with human rights barrister, Amal Clooney,
provided the court with an in-depth historical background of the
Armenian Genocide and warned about the dangers of genocide denial.
“Genocide denial can have double impact. It can make genocide
survivors and their children and grandchildren feel the worthlessness
and contempt and inferiority that the initial perpetrators intended,”
said Robertson, adding that denial can incite, “admirations for those
perpetrators and a dangerous desire to emulate them.”
Comments, protests
Bedo Demirdjian, Communications and PR officer for the European
Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy (EAFJD), said that “denial
of Genocide, inciting hate and making racist comments in Europe are not
a right, but are crimes that should be punished accordingly.” EAFJD was
involved in a supporting role to one of the third parties that
intervened on behalf of Armenia.
Demirdjian, who followed the court hearings in Strasbourg, said that
“Perincek’s defense tried to confuse the court by saying that he doesn’t
refute the massacres of Armenians; acknowledges the pain suffered; and
[argues] that Turks have also been killed, [which is why] we cannot give
the Genocide [that] characterization. This is unacceptable to us:
equating the victim and perpetrator. This is the official line of the
Turkish state to whitewash their crime.”
Speaking to Yerkir Media a day before the trial, ARF Bureau member
Mourad Papazian said, “We don’t think that the ECHR will side with
Perincek and Turkey because truth is on our side.”
Hundreds of Turkish protestors gathered outside the courthouse (Photo: EAFJD)
According to police, hundreds of Turkish protestors gathered outside
the courthouse, carrying Turkish and Azeri flags, portraits of Ataturk,
and banners. Some began cheering as Perincek emerged from the court.
“The protestors were primarily Turkish nationalists, Kemalists, and
Perincek-sympathisers, who had come to the court in busses. In reality,
their protest does not present any real value to the case, since their
voices were not heard inside the court,” said Papazian, who is also the
chairman of the Co-ordination Council of Armenian organizations of
France (CCAF), and had attended the trial.
Armenian organizational representatives from across Europe as well as
dozens of Armenians also gathered in front of the Human Rights Court
building, calling for an end to genocide denial.
To watch the full video of the hearing, click here.
LOS ANGELES—New Jersey native and filmmaker Jon Milano is honoring
his connection to the Armenian community with “Straw Dolls,” a film that
focuses on the Armenian Genocide of 1915.
“Having grown up with such a strong Armenian community in New Jersey,
this is a subject that is close to my heart,” Milano said. “Your
friends have influence on you, whether you want to admit it or not. And
though I wasn’t born into the culture you certainly adapt and understand
the history.”
Milano recently detailed the two-year process of producing and directing
the film. “It is only controversial when people make it controversial.
It is true that the Turkish government has not recognized this atrocity;
however, we did not set out to make a film to protest the Turkish
government but rather tell a story that Hollywood is unwilling to tell.”
Milano said he wanted to make sure that the film was 100 percent historically accurate and that the stories
he told were true. “We took very little creative liberties with the
film, knowing full well that when we make this film, it must be rooted
in truth. Hence why the film took two years of research.”
The research uncovered hundreds of journals, photographs, survivor
interviews, and academic books. And when Douglas Kalajian, author of Stories My Father Never Finished Telling,
became involved, the team was able to uncover rare stories that stood
alone among the atrocities. “We wanted to find stand-alone stories,
slices of a much larger tale,” Milano said.
The film stars award-winning Iranian-Armenian actress Mary Apick and
Marco Khan(ian) (“10,000 BC” (2008) and “God’s Not Dead” (2014)), with a
full ensemble of young Armenian actors. Once the cast was secured,
Milano explained, finding Armenia in Southern California was the next
task at hand. “We didn’t anticipate it to be an easy feat, but we also
didn’t expect it to take as long as it did.” After 36 location scouts
encompassing all of Los Angeles County, the team expanded its search
north of the city.
“We had toured numerous movie ranches in the area, but everyone of
them either didn’t meet our needs or out-weighed our budget. But then we
found it, and in Simi Valley of all places.” The location is not a
stranger to Hollywood, as it was home to Quentin Tarantino’s “Django
Unchained” (2012) and “Saving Mr. Banks” (2013). “Needless to say we
felt in good hands.”
Photography of the film was completed in November 2014 and is slated to premiere in Los Angeles and Yerevan on April 24, 2015.
“Regardless of the outcome, we made this film not only for ourselves but for the Armenian people,” Milano said.
YEREVAN (A.W.)—In a strongly worded letter, President Serge Sarkisian
on Jan. 16 responded to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s
invitation to Turkey on April 24, to attend commemoration ceremonies
marking the centennial of the WWI Gallipoli campaign.
President Serge Sarkisian (Photo: Official website of the President of Armenia)
“Turkey continues its conventional denial policy and is ‘perfecting’
its instrumentation for distorting history. This time, Turkey is marking
the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Gallipoli on April 24, even
though the battle began on March 18, 1915 and lasted until late January
1916; while the allies’ operation started on April 25,” wrote Sarkisian,
adding, “What is the purpose [of this] if not to distract the world’s
attention from the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide?”
According to Hurriyet Daily, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
has also sent invitation letters to his counterparts. A Turkish
government official has told Hurriyet that Erdogan sent the invitation
to Sarkisian because Armenians, among other ethnic groups, also fought
at Gallipolli as part of the Ottoman army. “We fought together in
Gallipolli. That’s why we have extended the invitation to Sarkisian as
well,” the official was quoted as saying.
In his letter, Sarkisian chose to highlight the case of one Armenian,
artilleryman Captain Sarkis Torosyan who loyally served in the Ottoman
Army and fought in the Battle of Gallipoli and in return met a bloody
end, while his family was brutally massacred and deported. “The wave of
massacres and forceful deportations planned and perpetrated by the
Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people also led to the death of
Sargis Torosyan; his parents were among the 1.5 million victims of the
Genocide; while his sister perished in the Syrian Desert,” wrote
Sarkisian.
“Peace and friendship must first be hinged on the courage to confront
one’s own past, historical justice and universal memory,” continued
Sarkisian. The President also called on Erdogan to substantiate his
calls for world peace by calling on the world to recognize the Genocide.
“Each of us has a duty to transmit the real story to the future
generations and prevent the repetition of crimes and prepare the ground
for rapprochement and future cooperation between peoples, especially
neighboring peoples,” added Sarkisian.
Erdogan has sent invitations to more than 100 heads of states.
According to Turkish sources, Britain’s Prince Charles and his two sons
will be present at the ceremonies commemorating the Battle of Gallipoli,
so will Australia’s and New Zealand’s prime ministers. Around 8,500
Australians and 2,000 New Zealanders are also expected to participate in
the April 24 ceremonies. On April 23, a “Summit of Peace” is reportedly
being planned to mark the 95th anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Parliament.
Meanwhile, during a joint press conference with Azerbaijani Preisdent
Ilham Aliyev on Jan. 15, Erdogan said, “We sent invitations to many
heads of states and governments for April, 24. We will be together with
my brother İlham Aliyev on April, 24 in Çanakkale.”
Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan greeted Azeri President Ilham Aliyev on
Jan. 15, in the presence of 16 soldiers dressed in ceremonial costumes
representing various Turkic people in history. (Photo: Official website
of the President of Turkey)
Below is the text of Sarkisian’s letter to Erdogan.
***
Dear Mr. President,
I received your invitation to participate in the commemoration
ceremonies marking the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Gallipoli.
World War I is one of the darkest pages of human history, which
resulted in the loss of millions of innocent lives and the mutilation of
destinies.
Armenian artilleryman, Captain Sargis Torosyan joined the troops of
the Ottoman Empire in the Battle of Gallipoli and was an officer who was
dedicated to ensuring the defense and security of the Empire. For his
loyal service and sacrifices, he had received military honors. That same
year, however, the wave of massacres and forceful deportations planned
and perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people also
led to the death of Sargis Torosyan. Torosyan’s parents were among the
1.5 million victims of the Genocide, while his sister perished in the
Syrian Desert.
It was as a result of that unprecedented massacre that Rafael Lemkin
coined the term “genocide,” and it was the impunity of that crime that
prepared the ground for the Holocaust and the genocides in Rwanda,
Cambodia, and Darfur.
According to you, the Battle of Gallipoli symbolize—not only for
Turkey, but for the entire world—friendly relations that were borne out
of war; while the battlefield is a reminder of the bitter consequences
of war and a memorial to peace and friendship. Leaving aside the
significance of the Battle of Gallipoli or Turkey’s disputable role
during WWI and WWII, we need to remember that peace and friendship must
first be hinged on the courage to confront one’s own past, historical
justice and universal memory.
Alas, Turkey continues its conventional denial policy and is
“perfecting” its instrumentation for distorting history. This time,
Turkey is marking the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Gallipoli on
April 24, even though the battle began on March 18, 1915 and lasted
until late January 1916; while the allies’ operation started on April
25. What is the purpose [of this] if not to distract the world’s
attention from the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide? Turkey
had a much more important duty to its own people and humanity: the
recognition of the Armenian Genocide and its condemnation.
Therefore, I would advise you to remember in your calls for world
peace to make a call to the world to recognize the Armenian Genocide and
commemorate the 1.5 million innocent victims. Each of us has a duty to
transmit the real story to the future generations and prevent the
repetition of crimes and prepare the ground for rapprochement and future
cooperation between peoples, especially neighboring peoples.
P.S. Your Excellency, a couple of months ago, I invited you to
Yerevan to respect the memory of the innocent martyrs of the Armenian
Genocide together on April 24, 2015. Armenians don’t accept being hosted
by the guest without receiving a response to the guest’s invitation
first.
Turkish president accuses 'the West' of being behind Charlie Hebdo
attacks and deliberately 'blaming Muslims' as conspiracy theories sweep
the Internet accusing Israel of orchestrating it
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested French security forces knew of attack
Turkish President said the West is 'playing games with the Islamic world'
Said: 'French citizens carried out massacre, and Muslims pay the price'
Published:
10:45 EST, 13 January 2015
| Updated:
14:27 EST, 13 January 2015
The
President of Turkey has suggested French security forces are to blame
for the deadly terrorist attacks in Paris last week, since the culprits
had recently served prison sentences.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused the West of 'playing games with the Islamic world', warning fellow Muslims to be 'aware'.
Erdogan
said Muslims are 'paying the price' for the attacks on satirical
magazine Charlie Hebdo and a Jewish kosher supermarket in Paris last
week.
Scroll down for video
+4
Blame game: Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan suggested French security forces were behind the Paris
attacks as they 'track' former prisoners and the culprits in the Charlie
Hebdo shootings had served time
'French citizens carry out such a massacre, and Muslims pay
the price,' Erdogan said yesterday.
'That's very meaningful ... Doesn't their intelligence
organisation track those who leave prison?
'Games are being played with the Islamic world, we need to
be aware of this.
'The
West's hypocrisy is obvious. As Muslims, we've never taken part in
terrorist massacres. Behind these lie racism, hatespeech and
Islamophobia,' Erdogan added.
Erdogan also denounced Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu for attending a solidarity rally in France on Sunday
with other world leaders after the Paris attacks.
'How can a man who has killed 2,500 people in Gaza with
state terrorism wave his hand in Paris, like people are waiting
in excitement for him to do so? How dare he go there?' he said.
Erdogan denounced Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for his attendance at the Unity rally in
Paris alongside, from left to right, Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar
Keita, French President Francois Hollande, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, EU President Donald Tusk and Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas
+4
Erdogan made the comments at a meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara on Monday
Erdogan did not attend the Sunday march, though Turkish
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu participated.
Erdogan is not the only senior Turkish politicianpublicly voicing conspiracy theories over the Paris attacks.
The
Mayor of Ankara, Melih Gokcek, said he was convinced the Israeli
intelligence service Mossad was behind the attacks, linking them to
France's recent move towards recognising Palestine as an independent
state.
'Mossad is definitely behind such incidents… it is boosting enmity towards Islam.' Mr Gokcek said, according to Financial Times.
In Russia, several pro-Kremlin commentators blamed the United States and the CIA for the attack, the newspaper reported.
One,
Alexei Martynov, director of the International Institute for New
States, said 'I am sure that some American supervisors are responsible
for the terror attacks in Paris, or in any case the Islamists who
carried them out.'
When
I try to imagine my grandfather, the face that appears to me is a
variation of a pencil drawing that hangs in my parents’ house. The
drawing captures the earliest image of him that we have in our family.
He appears to be in his thirties, and he stares down from the wall with a
serious countenance, a sharply groomed mustache, a tall, stiff collar, a
tie pin. He seems like a self-possessed man, with an air of formality: a
formidable person.
I never had the chance to
meet him. I was born in the nineteen-seventies, on Long Island, and he
was born in the eighteen-eighties, in the Ottoman Empire, near the
Euphrates River. He died in 1959—the year that the first spacecraft
reached the moon, Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba, and Philip Roth
published “Goodbye, Columbus,” though I suspect he would have known
nothing of those things. What he knew was privation, mass violence,
famine, deportation—and how to survive, even flourish, amid such
circumstances.
My
grandfather spent most of his life in Diyarbakir, a garrison town in
southeastern Turkey. Magnificent old walls surround the city; built of
black volcanic rock, they were begun by the Romans and then added to by
Arabs and Ottomans. In 1915, the Ottomans turned the city, the
surrounding province, and much of modern-day Turkey into a killing
field, in a campaign of massacres and forced expulsions that came to be
known as the Armenian genocide. The plan was to eradicate the empire’s
Armenians—“a deadly illness whose cure called for grim measures”—and it
was largely successful. The Ottomans killed more than a million people,
but, somehow, not my grandfather.
He guided his
family safely through the tumult, and he remained in the city long
afterward, enduring the decades of subtler persecution that followed.
There was no real reckoning for the perpetrators of the genocide; many
of them helped build the modern Turkish republic, founded in 1923. The
violence may have been over, but its animating ideology persisted. As
İsmet İnönü, the President of Turkey from 1938 to 1950, said, “Our duty
is to make Turks out of all the non-Turks within the Turkish country, no
matter what. We will cut out and throw away any element that will
oppose Turks and Turkishness.” The state cut away Armenians from its
history. At the ruins of Ani, an ancient Armenian city near the
country’s northeastern border, there was no mention of who built or
inhabited it. In Istanbul, no mention of who designed the Dolmabahçe
Palace, once home to sultans. This policy of erasure was called
“Turkification,” and its reach extended to geography: my grandfather’s
birthplace, known since the days of Timur as Jabakhchour (“diffuse
water”), was renamed Bingöl (“a thousand lakes”). By a law enacted in
1934, his surname, Khatchadourian (“given by the cross”), was changed to
Özakdemir (“pure white iron”).
Diyarbakir
became a city of wounded cosmopolitanism, its minorities—Christians,
Jews, Yazidis—greatly diminished. Still, my grandfather persisted, until
1952. My father, the twelfth of his children, grew up in Diyarbakir,
and I grew up listening to his stories about it. At parties, over
glasses of coffee or raki, he described the place in mythic terms, as a
kind of Anatolian Macondo, populated by people with names like Haji
Mama, Deli Weli, Apple Popo. But my grandfather was always elusive in
those stories, his path to survival a mystery. For nearly a century, the
Turkish state has denied the Armenian genocide—until recently, you
could be prosecuted even for referring to it—and so any inquiry into
such things would have been fraught. But not long ago a curious thing
happened. Diyarbakir, breaking with the state policy, began to indicate
that, once again, its people wanted it to serve as a shared homeland.
The centerpiece of the city’s experiment in renewal is a cathedral that
once touched all the city’s Armenian inhabitants, my grandfather among
them.
The
Church of Sts. Cyriacus and Julietta, named for an early-Christian
child martyr and his mother, is a wide, imposing structure, made of
carved volcanic rock, that stands at the center of old Diyarbakir. In
Italian, the child is San Quirico; in Armenian, Sourp Giragos. The
largest Armenian church in the Middle East, it was built in the
nineteenth century to a design of ecclesiastical minimalism, with a
basilica containing seven altars, and a flat wooden roof supported by
sixteen monolithic stone columns and rows of gracefully tapering arches.
The church has gone through many cycles of destruction. In 1880, it
burned to ashes, and was rebuilt. In 1913, lightning destroyed its bell
tower. Its replacement, a semi-Gothic spire housing an expensive
eight-sided clock and a bell cast in Istanbul, was destroyed during the
genocide—struck down on May 28, 1915, by cannon fire, because the spire
surpassed the height of the city’s minarets. Or so one account claims. I
should mention a more authentic-sounding story passed down in my
family: One day, the spire’s architect turned up at my grandfather’s
door with his tools and treasured belongings, urging him to keep them
all, relaying a plan to disappear. Days later, one of the spire’s
builders turned up, too, full of conflict, explaining that officials had
ordered him to dismantle the spire so that its carvings and contents
could be repurposed or sold.
After
the genocide, the church and the few remaining Armenians of Diyarbakir
became locked in a ruinous spiral, diminishing together. For a time,
Sourp Giragos served as a warehouse for a state-owned bank, and as a
provisional military facility. My father remembers, as a boy, looking
into the basilica and seeing recruits line up to be dipped into barrels
of insecticide. By the time my grandfather emigrated, the church’s most
active members could fit in one photo, which my aunt keeps, carefully
annotated, in one of her albums. As could be expected, the great
basilica fell into disuse, with the community instead assembling in a
small chapel, which my grandfather helped finance. But even this modest
chapel was not small enough. People continued to leave. By 1985, there
was no longer a priest: Father Arsen suddenly absent, young Kurdish boys
no longer teasing him in the stone alleyways (“a monk, a monk, a glass
in his rump”). Eight years later, with snow accumulating on Sourp
Giragos’s neglected roof, the whole thing collapsed. Eventually, there
was just Antranik Zor, a strange old man, the guardian of the ruins, who
told visitors, “Everyone is gone, they have become part of the earth,
only I am left.”
My sister visited Sourp Giragos
at its nadir, about fifteen years ago, and found Uncle Anto, as he was
known, sitting on a rock, dishevelled: loose shirt, cardigan tucked into
sweatpants. Through a friend, she spoke to him in Turkish, but he just
sat there, mute, empty-sighted. Later that afternoon, she returned and
spoke to him in Armenian, and he jolted into alertness: Who are you? Where did you come from? We haven’t had a priest for so long. Do you know the Lord’s Prayer?
She recited it, and he wept, and then he led her into a shed behind the
ruins, a cluttered place illuminated by a single light bulb. He
rummaged among his things, telling my sister that he had been waiting
for her so she could protect a relic he had been guarding. He emerged
with a Bible, its cover torn away, and told her to take the book to
where it might be safe. He spoke with desperate urgency of what they would do if it remained, if they
found it. My sister took the Bible, of course, and kept it at her
house. Shortly afterward, I visited Diyarbakir, too, and went looking
for Uncle Anto, but people near Sourp Giragos said he had been
hospitalized—in fact, he would never leave his bed again. In the church,
Kurdish boys were playing soccer, their ball arcing across the
vandalized basilica, passing through the shadows of columns and arches
that by then held up only sky.
The news of the
city’s changed atmosphere came quietly, five or six years ago, with the
unlikely talk that Sourp Giragos was going to be rehabilitated as a
functioning church—even though there was no congregation for it anymore.
Then, in 2011, an item in the Armenian Weekly (which has arrived at my parents’ house for as long as I can remember) made clear that the talk was real. “Sourp Giragos Opens to the Faithful,”
it noted, adding that the structure “stood as defiant as ever to the
forces suppressing freedom in Turkey.” Several hundred people turned up
for the reconsecration, nearly all of them having flown in, mostly from
Istanbul, or from abroad. Diyarbakir’s mayor, Osman Baydemir, told the
Armenian visitors, “You are not our guests. We are your guests.”
Abdullah Demirbaş, the mayor of the city’s old district, where my family
had lived, even made reference to the great taboo—the genocide—saying,
“Our grandparents, incited by others, committed wrongs, but we, their
grandchildren, will not repeat them.”
Hundreds of
people began coming to Sourp Giragos every day, the visits minor acts
of curiosity, atonement, remembrance, a reckoning with a distant
Armenian identity. Some came trying to piece together family history,
lost stories of survival. Last April, I packed a bag (and the old Bible)
and made the journey, too—to solve the mystery of my grandfather’s
survival, if possible, and to learn how the cathedral had been
resurrected, how the city had so unexpectedly changed, and how a century
of contested history could finally appear to be resolved.
Diyarbakir’s
walls loom from a distance as you approach, but inside them the old
city feels small, almost cloistered. My father told me that during his
childhood the walls were ruins infested with snakes and scorpions, and
he wouldn’t have dreamed of going near them. Like Sourp Giragos, the
walls are now being renovated; new parks line the fortifications, which
people are free to climb. Throughout the old city, historic buildings
are being restored, the urban renewal accompanied by deeper social and
political changes. For more than ten years, Diyarbakir was under
“emergency rule”; ethnic tensions were high, and the fears that Uncle
Anto had felt—of what they would do if they came—were
discernible. These days, if a stranger, a shopkeeper, a person offering
directions learns that you are Armenian and of Diyarbakir ancestry, you
will be ushered into a home, welcomed with tea, treated like a long-lost
relative deserving honor. You will be hemşerim: a person of this place.
When
I met with Abdullah Demirbaş, the old city’s mayor, he had just
completed his second term, and he was between political appointments.
Demirbaş is Kurdish, and it quickly became apparent that the story of
Sourp Giragos’s revival was inseparable from the interweaving narratives
of political violence that bound together Armenians, Kurds, and Turks
for more than a century. The municipality’s welcoming atmosphere, and
its willingness to challenge orthodoxies about the genocide, is in many
ways a Kurdish story. In
1915, in Diyarbakir, Kurds were among the main executors of the
genocide; members of prominent Kurdish clans helped plan the massacres
for the Ottoman bureaucracy and grew rich by the seizure of property. In
the countryside, Kurdish tribal chieftains carried out the killings
with pitiless savagery. But then, not long after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
formed the modern Turkish republic, the Kurds themselves became the
objects of Turkification, as the state initiated a process to eradicate
their culture. The irony was not lost on foreign observers: “It is a
curious trick of fate that the Kurds, who were the principal agent
employed for the deportation of Armenians, should be in danger of
suffering the same fate as the Armenians only twelve years later,” the
British Ambassador in Ankara reported, in 1927.
Eventually,
a pathological, contradictory view of Kurds gained currency in Ankara, a
view that denied that Kurds existed as a distinct ethnicity while at
the same time holding that they would be irrevocably foreign unless they
renounced all that made them distinct. The state insisted that Kurds
were merely “Mountain Turks,” a form of Turkish peasantry. An armed
nationalist movement, led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party—the
P.K.K.—emerged, and with it came the “emergency rule” in the region. The
state’s agents razed villages, clearing the countryside. Extrajudicial
killings were rampant, and Diyarbakir’s prison became notorious for
torture and disappearances. As a Kurdish politician recalled, “They hung
me up by my arms, nude, and attached electric wires to my genitals and
anus. When they turned on the current, my whole body would tremble; they
call this ‘doing the plane.’ ”
As the villagers
fled to Diyarbakir from the surrounding areas, it became a Kurdish city.
In time, the Diyarbakir Kurds began to recognize that their role in the
genocide was a kind of original sin in their modern political history.
“I remember this one Armenian priest,” Demirbaş told me. “A Kurd was
insulting him, and this priest told him, ‘We were the breakfast for
them, you will be the lunch. Don’t forget.’ And that was important for
me.”
Demirbaş, a big man with an easy smile, was
born in 1966, in a Kurdish village called Sise; his family moved to
Diyarbakir when he was one. “When I first went to primary school, I
wasn’t able to speak Turkish,” he said. “The teacher asked me a
question, and I didn’t understand, and the next thing I remember she was
holding my ears and bashing my head against the wall. I didn’t go to
school for a week.” The school he attended was Süleyman Nazif
Elementary, named for an Ottoman notable. Thirty years earlier, my
father had attended the same school, and I recalled similar stories from
him about everyday aggression—about the insult gâvur, meaning
“infidel,” the epithet carrying echoes of 1915. For my father, the
atmosphere was intolerable, and he dropped out; my grandfather bought
his diploma with bags of rice.
Demirbaş had the
opposite reaction: inspired by Socrates, he became a teacher of
philosophy. Between 1983 and 1991, the Kurdish language was illegal, but
he and his wife named their daughter Berfin, the Kurdish name for a
pale-colored flower—a decision that instantly triggered prosecution. The
legal battle went to Turkey’s Supreme Court, and by the time Demirbaş
won, his daughter was a year old. As a teacher, he confronted the
bureaucracy of Turkification with similarly mild gestures, each time
eliciting a severe legal reaction. The government moved Demirbaş from
school to school. In 2001, he was posted to Sivas, a deeply conservative
city, where he wrote a press release stating that all people in Turkey
had a right to education in their native languages. He was fired.
Destitute, he returned to Diyarbakir, and was elected to lead a
teachers’ union. From there, he entered politics, and in 2004 he became
mayor of Diyarbakir’s old city. At
the time he lost his teaching job, he had been charged in as many as a
hundred cases. Some of them, owing to changes in the law, were dropped;
many others were added, and now he does not know how many there are. His
lawyer told him that if he lost every case his combined prison term
would be four hundred and eighty-three years. It seemed strange that
Demirbaş could not keep track of his legal affairs, but as he spoke
about his cases, I began to understand his confusion. Shortly after he
was elected, a twelve-year-old Kurdish boy was fatally shot while police
were gunning down his father, in front of their house; Demirbaş erected
a sculpture to mark the tragedy, with thirteen holes carved into it,
representing the boy’s gunshot wounds. He was prosecuted: misuse of
municipal office and resources. (Three years.) The case went to the
Supreme Court, which remanded it to a terrorism court, which threw it
out—though now, on appeal, it has made its way back to the Supreme
Court. In 2006, at a conference in Vienna, he presented a paper,
“Municipal Services and Local Governments in Light of Multilingualism.”
This time, the charge against him was “propagandizing for a terrorist
organization.” (Five years.) When he issued a multilingual tourist
brochure, in Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrian, he was charged.
He was charged for speaking Kurdish while officiating at a wedding.
In
2007, the government forced Demirbaş out of office, and so he phoned a
friend who owned a house near the municipal headquarters and set himself
up there as shadow mayor. Journalists, dignitaries, and assemblymen
still sought his advice, as did his constituents, who came by the
hundreds, with offerings of tea and sugar. Members of his former staff
raised funds to cover a small budget and volunteered during off hours.
Demirbaş’s teen-age children took jobs to support the family. In this
way, he continued his term. And the state continued finding new ways to
charge him.
In
2009, Diyarbakir Armenians—living, as many did, in Istanbul—came to
Demirbaş to discuss restoring the cathedral. Demirbaş had just been
reëlected, by a wide margin, and the national attitude toward the
Armenian minority and toward the genocide was slowly beginning to
soften. The ascendancy of Recep Erdoğan, of the Justice and Development
Party, to the office of Prime Minister, in 2003, initially signalled a
new willingness to confront Turkish political orthodoxies. In Istanbul,
the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink founded Agos, a
newspaper—and when Dink was assassinated, in 2007, a hundred thousand
people protested, many holding up signs that said, “We are all
Armenians!” Thirty thousand people also put their names to a statement
of apology, which read, “My conscience does not accept the denial of,
and the insensitivity toward, the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman
Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and I share
the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize
to them.” The Ministry of Culture restored an important Armenian
cathedral on an island in Lake Van.
But the
limits to these gestures were unmistakable. The state had renovated the
Lake Van cathedral, but as a museum; for three years, it would not allow
a Mass to be held there. Turkification had not fully abated. As
recently as 2005, the Environment and Forestry Ministry announced plans
to correct the “ill intent” of scientific nomenclature that violated
“Turkish unity”: thus, the species of deer known as Capreolus capreolus armenus became Capreolus capreolus capreolus.
Even as people mourned Hrant Dink, death threats poured into his former
office. And when the Turkish President, Abdullah Gül, responding to the
apology campaign, offered a woolly statement about the possibility of
“dialogue,” a nationalist accused him of having Armenian ancestry. Gül,
rushing to prove a genealogy of Turkishness “for centuries,” sued for
defamation—and won. In parliament, a legislator’s motion to adopt the
apology caused an uproar; the chairman cut him off, accusing him of
“insulting the society in which you live.” A new campaign—“I do not apologize”—got far more signatories.
The
Diyarbakir Armenians went to the Ministry of Culture, seeking financial
assistance to renovate the church. The ministry agreed to pay the full
cost, more than two million dollars, but only in exchange for the deed,
intending to convert the structure into a museum. Vartkes Ergün Ayık,
the head of the Sourp Giragos Foundation, which led the restoration
effort, told me that it took no time to decline: better to let it remain
in ruins than stand as an empty symbol. Instead, he brought a
delegation to see Diyarbakir’s mayor, Osman Baydemir, whose jurisdiction
spanned the entire city. Baydemir, whose family had sheltered Armenians
a century earlier, agreed to help, but argued that a majority of the
financing should come from Armenians, so that they would be invested in
the project. In the end, Ayık secured most of the funding from private
donors. Ayık’s
family had left Diyarbakir the same year that mine had, in 1952, and I
learned that my grandparents had arranged for my father to work a few
summers in his father’s haberdashery, near the Great Mosque. By the
standards of the city, this practically made us family. In the
nineteen-fifties, Ayık’s father had campaigned to have Sourp Giragos
returned to Armenians from the state-owned bank, and Ayık was in many
ways following in his footsteps. One night at his home, he showed me
binders of notes that his father had made: survival testimonies typed up
on onionskin paper, folk poems, Ottoman deeds, lists of Armenian
villages, their old and new names—the basis of a lost manuscript that he
was trying to find. Although Ayık acknowledged the Kurds’ regret, he
seemed unwilling to relinquish his caution. Already, academics had
coined a new term, “Kurdification,” to describe the Kurds’ effort to
claim their place in the region’s culture. He recalled one day asking
Demirbaş, “If Kurdish autonomy were granted, then would your embrace of
minority rights remain?” Demirbaş laughed and said yes.
In
truth, the benevolent conspiracy to rebuild Sourp Giragos—Armenians and
Kurds working in an unlikely partnership—was fragile. Just as
reconstruction began, in 2009, both Diyarbakir mayors were indicted in a
dragnet, apparently designed to crush the region’s Kurdish political
leadership. Demirbaş’s home was raided at 5:30 a.m. Police
detained him at gunpoint, and, at the station, he found himself being
handcuffed by a former student—with the student, eyes full, hesitating,
and Demirbaş assuring him that there was no point in delay. The charge
was grave—membership in an illegal affiliate of the P.K.K.—and Demirbaş
denied it. He stayed in the Diyarbakir prison until 2010, when he was
released for medical reasons. The case is ongoing.
Still,
he kept at it. He set out to rename three streets for local writers: a
Kurd, an Armenian, and an Assyrian. He used municipal funds to run
Armenian-language courses and erected a signboard in Armenian welcoming
visitors. Within his jurisdiction, seventeen parcels of land that had
been taken from the church were returned. He told the Armenian Weekly,
“We want the people living in the city to realize that, historically,
Diyarbakir has always been a multicultural city.” When the Weekly asked, “What is your message to the Armenians who were uprooted from their ancestral lands?” Demirbaş said, “Return!”
My
grandfather arrived in the city as a young child in dire circumstances.
His story begins in Jabakhchour, about a hundred miles north of
Diyarbakir, where his father, Khatchadour, was a prominent landowner.
Khatchadour had two stepsons, and, in the eighteen-eighties, one of them
shoved a Kurdish man in a fight, and the man fell to his death. The
stepson was imprisoned and sentenced to death by hanging, but
Khatchadour paid to have his life spared. Outraged, the Kurdish man’s
family burned his fields, stole his livestock, and threatened murder.
Khatchadour took his family—including my grandfather, who was probably
no more than two years old—and fled toward Diyarbakir, where Sourp
Giragos had established itself as a haven for pilgrims. Along the way,
they met an Armenian tailor—a terzi, in Turkish—who lived in
the city, and he invited them to stay with him. Not long after, another
disaster struck: a cholera epidemic swept through Diyarbakir, killing
Khatchadour and two of his children. My grandfather and his mother were
spared, though, and the tailor looked after them.
Diyarbakir
was in a state of upheaval. The empire was declining precipitously, and
Ottoman leaders, hoping to maintain a dominion that extended from Tunis
to Basra, had imposed reforms, meant to unify peoples of different
faiths and languages around an Ottoman identity. The new measures
augmented individual rights, upending an old theocratic order that
placed the empire’s Christians beneath its Muslims, and they promised
greater equality for Armenians. But the reforms were fitfully enacted,
and for the most part they only made life worse. Many Kurds, feeling
that their divinely ordained status was threatened, lashed out violently
at their neighbors. The
sense of popular resentment was compounded after Ottomans lost
territory in the Russo-Turkish War. In the Treaty of Berlin, the Great
Powers sought to dictate the fate of the empire, committing the sultan
to implementing reforms “in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to
guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds.” The
sultan, Abdülhamid II, saw the Armenians’ strengthening ties to the West
as evidence of treason. He formed a Kurdish militia, to bring fiefs
under tighter state control, and he used it to exact punishment,
massacring a hundred thousand Armenians.
In
Diyarbakir, fears that the reforms would grant Armenians too much
autonomy erupted into a pogrom. (Süleyman Nazif wrote, “Like our
grandfathers before us, our principal task is to work for the glory of
the Caliphate and to augment its population. This is the road upon which
we will travel, to death.”) For three days in November, 1895, the city
was engulfed in ethnic violence. Gunfire broke out near the Great
Mosque, and Muslims pillaged Armenian shops and homes, going door to
door, killing hundreds. The market was set aflame, and the smoke was
visible for thirty-five miles.
No one in my
family knows how my grandfather survived, but it is clear that he was
finding a place for himself. When he was about ten, the tailor decided
to teach him his trade. “What is your family name?” the tailor asked. My
grandfather didn’t know, nor did his mother. So the tailor said, “Well,
what was your father’s name?” My grandfather said it was Khatchadour.
“Then your name will be Khatchadourian.”
My
grandfather’s given name was Hagop—Armenian for Jacob—but at some point
he also adopted a Muslim street name, Sait, and among non-Armenians
became known as Terzi Sait—Sait the tailor. Eventually, he opened a
store near the Great Mosque, in the center of the city, and on Easter
morning I went looking for the old storefront. Nothing of it remained,
but the area was still filled with tiny shops, lining an avenue that
bisects old Diyarbakir.
It
was a short walk from there to Sourp Giragos, past tea stalls, produce
venders, and a five-hundred-year-old minaret precariously balanced atop
four small columns. Closer to the church, the shops and street clutter
fell away; the narrow stone alleys became more uniform, the turns easier
to confuse. In places, the reconstructed bell tower loomed into view.
The effect of entering the large church courtyard—with its garden, its
sycamore maples, and its wooden tea tables—was similar to driving out of
a tunnel and emerging into the clear. Nothing of Sourp Giragos’s
dilapidation remained. The church had been built from “female basalt,”
volcanic rock so porous that it breathed. Because female basalt had been
mined to depletion, the porosity in many of the reconstructed stone
blocks was ersatz; still, one had the sense of entering a living
structure.
That Sunday was the first Easter to be
celebrated at the cathedral since its reconstruction, and a gruff
priest named Father Kevork had flown in from Istanbul to conduct Mass.
Although the church was open every day, the patriarchy was slow to
assign it a permanent priest. Likewise, Armenians living overseas seemed
hesitant about supporting the church, in a place where there was no
obvious community for it. Ayık was still struggling to raise four
hundred thousand dollars to pay outstanding bills. His daughter asked me
if I knew how to reach Kim Kardashian.
Part of
the apathy was surely rooted in a general suspicion about investing in a
country where “Armenian” is a form of slander. But Ayık thought there
might also be a deeper cultural pathology at work. To get behind a
functioning church would mean shedding the posture of enraged victim, he
argued. There was also a more obvious question: What was the building’s
purpose? Demirbaş said that the reconstruction was an act of
self-criticism, an apology, a symbol of harmony. Ayık said the church
served as a monument to those who had once been there. Yet these things
it could do just fine as a semi-dormant religious structure, with Father
Kevork now and again flying in.
It did not,
however, take long, sitting in that courtyard on Easter morning, to
understand that the new Sourp Giragos needed to function as a church to
fulfill its particular purpose in the climate of residual Turkification.
Uncle Anto had said, “Only I am left,” but it turned out that all
around the ruins of Sourp Giragos there were people of mixed Armenian
heritage, people whose fathers or mothers or grandmothers had been taken
in by Turks or Kurds in 1915, married into Muslim families, and assumed
new names and identities. In villages, where no one’s ancestry was ever
very secret, they were often recognized, and became known by the
epithet “remnants of the sword.” No one knows the true size of this
hidden population across Turkey, and estimates range from thirty
thousand to three million; the secret identities are only now starting
to emerge. A few years ago, a group of these people had come to Sourp
Giragos to be baptized, their names kept quiet for security reasons. But
that they had stepped forward was significant, and I could see how a
working church would signal, in ways a token one could not, that being
Armenian in Turkey was becoming acceptable.
On
Easter morning, the two church caretakers, Aram Khatchigian and Armen
Demirjian, were rushing around with preparations, but they took a few
minutes to have tea with me in the courtyard. “If you really dig deep,
sixty per cent of the people in the city have some Armenian background,”
Khatchigian told me. “I’m basing this on the people who come to the
church. From my family, seven people survived 1915. Actually, there were
seven orphans who had come together and supported each other—my
grandfather was one of them—and by supporting each other they ended up
becoming a family. If you look at their descendants, these people do
accept that they are Armenian, but nearly all of them are Muslims. From
the day I was born, I have known myself to be Armenian—unlike Armen, who
did not learn about it until he was twenty-five years old.” Both men,
given Muslim names at birth, renamed themselves in honor of Armenian
ancestors.
At nine or so in the morning,
Khatchigian walked to the entrance of the church and rang the bell.
Inside, pews were slowly filling, the air thickening with incense. In my
father’s childhood, Armenians gathered for Easter at the Chaldean
Catholic Church; they stayed past midnight on Holy Thursday, and at the
ceremony’s climax the lights were extinguished and hymns resounded in
the dark. Here the ceremony was informal, almost formless, with people
dropping in and out of attentiveness. Wandering among the eight hundred
people at Sourp Giragos—many of them Muslim—I could see that what they
were celebrating was not Easter but the idea that Easter had been
resurrected. As the crowd dispersed, I introduced myself to an elderly
man in the front pew.
“Who’s your grandfather?” he asked.
“Hagop Khatchadourian.”
“I don’t know anyone by that name. Who’s your father?”
“Puzant Khatchadourian.”
“I don’t know him, either.” The old man gazed past me. “I did know a Puzant, once,” he said. “A long time ago—Terzi Sait’s son.”
“But Terzi Sait was my grandfather,” I said.
“Yes, yes, Terzi Sait,” the man said. “I remember. A good man.”
My
grandfather’s assumed name means “happy” in Arabic, and I thought about
this the next day, on my way to a part of the old city called the
Citadel. Built upon an embankment overlooking the Tigris, the Citadel
once contained a prison, official buildings, gardens, a church, and a
mosque. A later addition was an office for the special-intelligence
branch of the gendarmerie. Many Kurds, taken there in the nineties,
never returned. In recent years, more than forty-five Kurdish mass
graves had been identified in the region, and in 2012 a cache of bones
was discovered at the Citadel. They were delivered to the Forensic
Medicine Institute, in Istanbul, which concluded that “the bones were
lying in the earth for at least one hundred years.” A century ago, the
Citadel was a departure point for the deportations of Armenians: forced
marches, the vast majority ending in death. Mass violence was buried in
the city like strata of rock. My grandfather used to say that in 1915 he
heard screams from the Citadel; the dead, he had recalled, were dumped
onto blood-soaked earth below.
II. INFERNO
A
century after the Armenian genocide, many details of its origins remain
obscure. The pervasive state denial has corrupted access to official
archives—with some closed, and others open in limited ways—and forced
upon the research the distortions of politics. Key Ottoman records are
missing or have been destroyed. Still, it is clear that the violence of
the genocide flowed from deep streams of political insecurity. Hitler
spoke of Germany being “broken and defenseless, exposed to the kicks of
all the world.” His Ottoman counterparts felt a similar civilizational
crisis.
In 1908, a group of reformers called the
Young Turks emerged from the empire’s periphery and began to wrest
control from the sultan. Pragmatic, fractious, and ideologically
malleable, they came to power promising greater freedoms and imperial
unity; they named their political party the Committee of Union and
Progress (C.U.P.). But the empire that they sought to unify was
inexorably unravelling. Within several years, they settled on a
principle called Turkism, which envisioned an ethnically unified state.
The idea was to create “an ideal homeland that gathers in all the Turks
and excludes foreigners.” A
C.U.P. office was opened in Diyarbakir by one of the movement’s central
ideologues. There is this story in our family: Near my grandfather’s
shop, by the Great Mosque, there was a khan where a mufti named Haji
İbrahim—who belonged to the prominent Pirinççizade clan—drank tea. My
grandfather began joining him, and they grew close. One day, as they sat
together, a young man approached: the mufti’s son, Şeref—handsome, full
of revolutionary fervor, the author of an article arguing that
Armenians were “treacherous.” Şeref spoke of joining the C.U.P., but his
father expressed uneasiness with the movement. “It smells of blood,” he
said. Gesturing toward my grandfather, he added, “No harm will come to
him.”
In 1914, my grandfather was about thirty—a
bachelor, still, unusually for his age. By then, he had established a
reputation for making Western clothing, and he took trips to Lebanon and
Syria to buy sewing equipment and luxurious fabric. He bought a house
by Diyarbakir’s Gâvur Mahallesi, the Infidel District—a gracious
building with a large courtyard, a well, and an old tree.
One day, he met a coppersmith who shared his surname. Kevork
Khatchadourian had a thin face, a long nose, big eyes. He, too, had
survived the pogrom of 1895. When the violence began, and Armenian
shopkeepers debated what to do, Kevork made his way to Sourp Giragos,
brought his children home from the school, and fortified the door with a
stone. His shop was destroyed. For a time, to escape cholera, the
family fled to a village. After they returned to Diyarbakir, his
financial situation remained dire, and he was forced to sell his house.
Kevork
and his family became tenants in my grandfather’s home. For my
grandfather’s mother, their arrival was fortuitous. She wanted her aging
son to marry—she said it, and said it, and said it, enough to engrave
it into time itself—and Kevork had a daughter, Zevart, an intelligent,
strong-willed girl with dark hair and dark eyes. Kevork’s wife was
protective of her: she was a schoolgirl, and my grandfather was twice
her age. But my grandfather’s mother was driven, and on Zevart’s
sixteenth birthday—February 14, 1914—they married. The First World War
had not yet begun, and perhaps the two had reason for optimism.
Still,
the empire was falling to pieces. Ethnic tensions were growing. In the
Balkan Wars, a series of mostly Christian rebel groups, abetted by
foreign allies, stripped the Ottomans of nearly all their European
territories. One military officer wrote, “Our anger is strengthening:
revenge, revenge, revenge.” A few months later, he became the Minister
of War. During the Armistice, the Great Powers again imposed reforms to
improve treatment of the Armenians, but they were never enacted. As
imperial unity became paramount, the C.U.P. began to enforce Turkism
through deportation. A system of quotas took shape, in which no Ottoman
territory should be more than ten per cent Armenian.
In
January, 1915, the empire suffered another catastrophic loss, this time
on the Russian front: tens of thousands of Ottoman soldiers lay dead,
and a deep Russian incursion seemed imminent. The loss was a result of
the First World War, but the crisis of war also offered an opportunity
for even more drastic measures. In March, a member of the C.U.P. noted,
“It has been decided to wash our hands of responsibility for this stain
that has been smeared across Ottoman history.” An élite security
apparatus, the Special Organization, insured that deportation meant
annihilation; it helped mobilize bands of irregulars, most prominent
among them Kurds who knew the landscape in detail. A new governor was
dispatched to Diyarbakir. He had vowed to take the “most decisive
measures.”
On
April 24th, in Istanbul, more than two hundred Armenian
intellectuals—poets, doctors, writers, members of parliament—were
arrested and, with a few exceptions, killed. The date marks the official
shackling of the empire’s salvation to genocide. Convoys were directed
into Diyarbakir Province or on into the Syrian Desert, to camps where
people were massacred or allowed to die from privation. Eventually, the
genocide became its own rationale. When the U.S. Ambassador implored the
Interior Minister to reverse course, he was told, “The hatred between
the Turks and the Armenians is now so intense that we have got to finish
with them. If we don’t, they will plan their revenge.”
Like
many Armenians outside Turkey, I grew up in an atmosphere where the
desire for revenge was not always easy to separate from the desire for
justice. In community centers, it was often possible to find posters of
Armenians who had murdered Turkish officials during a spate of political
assassinations in the seventies and eighties. They were
heroes—fedayeen—and children were encouraged to honor them, to write to
them if they were in prison. The idea of reconciliation was
unimaginable. Any distinction between Kurds and Turks was immaterial;
they were the same, worthy of the same suspicion, mockery, and hatred.
There
was an attendee at Sourp Giragos on Easter who knew this sense of
vengeance as well as anyone: Ara Sarafian, an independent historian,
activist, and combatant in the war over Anatolian history. Sarafian’s
family had mostly survived the genocide and afterward had moved to
Cyprus, where he spent his childhood. But, in 1974, while he and his
parents were in London on a family vacation, the Turkish Army invaded
Cyprus, and they were suddenly refugees. Perhaps it was inevitable that
he would come to hate Turks, with a deep teen-age hatred. As a graduate
student, he vowed to learn Turkish to confront the state’s official
denials as a scholar. “I wanted to hurt Turks,” he told me. He applied
for a fellowship in Ankara, and when he was turned down (his Armenian
surname the deciding factor, he was certain) he went anyway, paying his
tuition by teaching English. Coming to Turkey transformed him, in an
unexpected way. The combined effect of getting to know Turkish citizens,
of higher education, of maturity, and of changing Turkish politics
eroded the teen-age hatred until he began to seek out opportunities for
reconciliation. In London, he founded a small press, called the Gomidas
Institute, with a straightforward mission: unearthing and publishing
firsthand accounts of 1915. But in the past few years he has widened his
portfolio, making trips to Turkey to investigate how the genocide
remains a part of lived experience there, and how official denials are
at odds with local memory. Sarafian regards his new work as
ambassadorial, engaging in a cautious handshake with politicians like
Abdullah Demirbaş.
Recently, Sarafian went to
Bitlis, the ancestral home of William Saroyan, to encourage its mayor to
name a street after the writer. A friend there took him into the
countryside. “We went to this one village,” he told me. “And we met this
Kurdish man who owned a fish farm, and there was an old church, a very
small church, and this guy made us tea and said, ‘You know, I own this
church.’ And I could have said nothing, I could have let it go, but I
asked him, ‘How can you own a church?’ And he said, ‘It’s quite simple,
really. In 1915, an order came down to kill all the Armenians, and
afterward we divided up the property, and that is how our family got
this church.’ As I was leaving, he came to me and said, ‘You tell me
what you want me to do with this church, and I will do it.’ Now, how can
I hate this guy? I have to embrace him.”
Last
year, Sarafian obtained permission from Diyarbakir’s leadership to
commemorate the genocide there—the first time such a thing had been
achieved. He organized a ceremony on a bridge spanning the Tigris, from
which mourners tossed rose petals into the river. A few months later,
Demirbaş urged the Turkish government to follow the city’s example: “We
Kurds, in the name of our ancestors, apologize for the massacres and
deportations of the Armenians and Assyrians in 1915. We will continue
our struggle to secure atonement and compensation for them.”
During
his stay in Diyarbakir, Sarafian had ventured into the countryside, to
conduct interviews with villagers. In his research, he stumbled on the
descendants of a Kurdish tribe that had gone to war in 1915 to protect
Armenians. Since that visit, Sarafian had wanted to plant rosebushes at
the tribal leader’s grave. The gesture was necessary, he said, to show
reciprocity, to underscore that the common Armenian biases against
Kurds—as bloodthirsty savages—could also be relinquished. “Kurds are
very apologetic,” he told me. “They know massacres took place, they know
Kurds were involved. It is up to us to say, ‘I appreciate your
sincerity and the manner in which you are dealing with this, that you
are feeling guilty—but we are in no way accusing Kurds as a nation of
being somehow predisposed to commit genocide.’ My criticism of Armenians
is that we shouldn’t just wallow in victimhood. It doesn’t help us,
either.”
The
day after Easter, I met Sarafian at his hotel to accompany him on the
trip. He has cropped graying hair and a perpetually furrowed brow. In a
rented car, we drove for about an hour and a half, and stopped near a
cluster of modest homes in isolated rock-strewn pastures. Several
men—gray suits, white shirts, open collars—approached. Sarafian embraced
one of them. The tribal leader in 1915 was Haji Mehmet Mishte, and this
was one of his grandsons, Recep Karabulut. Before long, Sarafian was
saying that Karabulut was like a brother, and Karabulut was saying that
Sarafian was kin. There were handshakes, callused grips. Sarafian
conversed quickly with the others: “I brought two roses, so we can plant them.”
“Let us go, let us go together.”
“We must pray.”
“Of course we will pray.”
The
village cemetery was just up the hill, one of the men said. We climbed
back into our car. “We have a common culture here,” Sarafian said as he
drove. “You can’t separate Armenians from Kurds.” When we reached the
graveyard, Sarafian took the rosebushes from the car and, giving one to
Karabulut, told him, “We have been separated by a hundred years.”
Karabulut said, “History has unified us now.” Then the men walked to an
Ottoman-era grave. The headstone had weathered, rounded edges, and
Arabic script carved on its face. A village cleric read the inscription,
a line of poetry about the impermanence of life, and then read the date
that concluded Mishte’s impermanence—which, it was determined after
much debate about the Ottoman calendar, was probably 1917. Sarafian tied
a strip of cloth to a nearby bush, an ancient ritual marking a
pilgrimage, and said a few words honoring Mishte. At the foot of the
grave, he began to dig. The shovel broke. But he continued, knees in the
soil, until the roses were firmly anchored. Everyone prayed.
The
tribe had slaughtered a lamb, and we headed to a house on a hill, where
it was served. While everyone ate, my eyes drifted to a muted TV, to a
news item about April 24th, the Armenian Day of Remembrance. For the
past several years, commemorations have been held in Istanbul. April
24th was just days away, and the story included file footage of a
previous year’s event: people sitting on pavement, holding photos of the
Armenian intellectuals who had been rounded up in the capital and
murdered. No calls for justice, no demands, just sitting, holding
pictures—each portrait, from a century ago, capturing its subject in a
hopeful act, innocent of what was to come.
For Diyarbakir, the genocide came in the form of the newly assigned vali,
or regional governor, Dr. Mehmet Reşid—an Ottoman middle manager of
startling effectiveness, responsible for the deaths of more than a
hundred thousand people. Reşid was a Muslim Circassian from the
Russian-controlled Caucasus, where his family had survived an earlier
violent purge. Beginning in 1860, the Tsar forced hundreds of thousands
of Muslims from the region, pursuing them to the shores of the Black
Sea, from which they were delivered to the Ottoman Empire on ships that
became known as “floating graveyards.” Reşid was born in 1873, and his
family moved to Istanbul a year later. He enrolled in the Military
School of Medicine and, preoccupied with the sultan’s despotism, helped
found the C.U.P. “I always desired law and justice,” he wrote in his
memoirs. “I always had the friendship and confidence of all my
companions; I never took part in certain villainous behavior.”
With
the Ottoman state collapsing around him, Reşid’s outlook began to
harden. He served in various official posts—the Aegean, Mosul,
Baghdad—growing increasingly concerned that the empire’s Christians
posed a grave internal threat. Ottoman Greeks, one C.U.P. member had
declared, “needed to be broken and destroyed,” and Reşid came to agree.
On the Aegean, he aggressively deported them, hoping to replace them
with Turkish refugees. By the time he arrived in Baghdad, he was a
changed man. As Süleyman Nazif recalled, “Instead of the old poised
character and calm, there was an appalling arrogance and anger.” In
Diyarbakir, Reşid confronted crumbling state authority. Corruption was
entrenched, and soldiers were deserting. Many deserters were Armenian,
and when they took to the city’s flattened rooftops they became known as
the Roof Battalion. Reşid saw in them an élite unit to massacre
Muslims; he arrested them and tried to extract information by torture,
but he discovered no plot. He imposed censorship, and proclaimed the
confiscation of all weapons. The Diyarbakir Armenians gathered to
discuss what to do; my grandfather later spoke of a meeting where a man
announced that he had stockpiled guns beyond the city walls. But the
community decided that militancy was too risky and surrendered their
weapons. Reşid, believing that Sourp Giragos had become a makeshift
armory, had it searched, its prelate murdered. He found nothing. In
time, the cathedral was looted. “Some poured out of the church clutching
thuribles, chalices, and other sacred vessels,” one observer recalled.
“They roamed streets sounding the cymbals and fly-flaps and treading on
the pages torn from the Bible.” Quickly,
Reşid created a strike force, designed to conduct “special measures”
and acts of “punishment” throughout the province. The unit became known
as the Butcher’s Battalion. Seeking to assemble Kurdish irregulars, he
pardoned exiled members of a tribe known for banditry. He reached out to
the tribe’s leaders and described a plan to put Armenians onto rafts
called keleks (branches piled atop inflated goat skins) and send them
down the Tigris. “I will give you convoy after convoy of Armenians,” he
said, according to an account by the grandson of one tribal leader. “You
will bring them by kelek across the Tigris. When you arrive at a place
where no one can see or hear, you will kill them all.” Reşid recommended
that the bodies be filled with rocks, in order to sink them. “Of the
gold, money, and jewels, half of it is yours, the other half you will
bring to me to give to the Red Crescent. But no one can hear or know
about this secret.”
In Diyarbakir, Reşid had
imprisoned nearly two thousand prominent Christians, mostly Armenians,
and in May, 1915, they were called into the prison courtyard, where
mufti İbrahim read a document explaining that they had been pardoned but
would be deported to Mosul: “You may return to your homes once the war
is terminated. You are delivered from a great responsibility.” Late that
month, more than six hundred Armenians were sent down the river and
killed. Reşid had notified his counterpart in Mosul to expect the rafts,
but they arrived empty, followed by bloated corpses and decomposed body
parts.
That summer, Fa’iz el-Ghusein, an Arab
lawyer and a former Ottoman official from Syria, travelled to
Diyarbakir. In a book titled “Martyred Armenia,” he wrote about the
surrounding desolation. A hundred miles north of Damascus, he
encountered men and women huddled under tents made from sheets and rugs.
He picked up stories of the death marches heading south. Then he began
to witness convoys—from a distance they looked like troops marching to
battle, but up close he could see that they were devastated crowds,
mostly women, barefoot, exhausted. “Whenever one of them lagged behind, a
gendarme would beat her with the butt of his rifle, throwing her on her
face, till she rose terrified and rejoined her companions,” he wrote.
“If one lagged from sickness, she was either abandoned, alone in the
wilderness, without help or comfort, to be a prey to wild beasts, or a
gendarme ended her life by a bullet.” At the city of Urfa, there were
Ottoman soldiers from Aleppo—an officer with a cannon had “turned the
Armenian quarters into a waste place.”
On the
final approach to Diyarbakir, the landscape grew bleaker still. “We went
on amid the mangled forms of the slain,” Ghusein recalled. “The same
sight met our view on every side; a man lying, his breast pierced by a
bullet; a woman torn open by lead; a child sleeping his last sleep
beside his mother; a girl in the flower of her age, in a posture which
told its own story. Such was our journey until we arrived at a canal,
called Kara Pounâr, near Diyarbakir, and here we found a change in the
method of murder and savagery. We saw here bodies burned to ashes. God,
from whom no secrets are hid, knows how many young men and fair girls,
who should have led happy lives together, had been consumed by fire in
this ill-omened place. We had expected not to find corpses of the killed
near to the walls of Diyarbakir, but we were mistaken, for we journeyed
among the bodies until we entered the city gate.”
Others
had similar stories. Süleyman Nazif found that the “smell of rotting
corpses permeated the atmosphere.” Responding to a complaint from an
Ottoman official in Syria that the rivers were clogged with the dead,
Reşid noted, “Those who were killed here are either being thrown into
deep deserted caves or, as has been the case for the most part, are
being burnt.” Eventually, the Interior Minister wrote with an order:
“Bury the deceased lying on the roads, throw their corpses into brooks,
lakes, and rivers, and burn their property left behind on the roads.”
Within
the city walls, my grandfather’s shop was destroyed, so he worked from
home, and people often turned up. There was an Armenian photographer who
had been engaged by the Turks to take propaganda pictures; he came to
share news, until one day he said he thought that he had seen too much,
and soon after he disappeared. There were relatives from Jabakhchour,
among them my grandfather’s remaining sister, ill with tuberculosis, who
left him a two-year-old girl. There was a woman whose husband had been
murdered, and an underfed Armenian soldier—“a man, very nice, and
pathetic, if you need him,” a priest from Sourp Giragos said, my aunt,
who knew the story, recalled. More and more people came, perhaps as many
as thirty, and hid in a charcoal pit, behind piles of wood, in an
underground tunnel.
The
mufti’s son, Şeref, also came; people were bringing him orphaned boys,
my aunt recalled, and he told my grandfather, “Let me give one or two to
you.” He brought a teen-ager from Bitlis named Kapriel. “My father
began asking around, trying to find his father, looking in the
newspaper, even contacting the Armenian cathedral in Istanbul,” my aunt
said. “There was news of someone who met Kapriel’s father’s description.
Kapriel wanted to go, and my father arranged for his travel. By the
time Kapriel got there, his father was dead for two days.”
My
grandfather had created a sanctuary, but it was not invulnerable. Once,
my father told me, a high-ranking police officer came to visit my
grandfather. My grandmother brought food, and my grandfather, who had a
habit of quietly nudging plates in the direction of guests, sat waiting.
The officer ate and, when he was done, began to speak. He had been
walking on the riverbank when he saw an Armenian woman my grandfather
knew, who was about to be raped; to spare her from misery, he had shot
her. My grandfather, unable to control his anger, kicked the officer
out, and the officer vowed that by morning the family would be put on
the caravans: a death sentence. (In my uncle’s version, the source of
the argument differs, but not the outcome.) My grandmother’s father,
Kevork, said that he would bolt the door, douse the house with gasoline,
and destroy the family rather than surrender. A sleepless night
followed; at dawn, the muezzin at the mosque called out. The streets
were quiet. My grandfather turned to one of the people in his house, an
Armenian man who passed as a Kurd in public. “Go to the mosque,” he
said, “and tell us what is happening.” The scout went, and found a
funeral in progress. The police officer had died shortly after leaving,
of a heart attack. On the way back, the scout broke cover, calling out
in Armenian, “The man is dead!” My grandfather went to see for himself,
mixing among the mourners, nodding, saying, “A good man.”
After
planting the roses, Ara Sarafian wanted to travel south, to the banks
of the Tigris, where Reşid had conspired with Kurds to attack the
keleks. In an old diplomatic report, he had found references to the
location, and on a previous visit he had gone looking for it. The report
was off by several miles, it turned out, but villagers corrected him.
“Kurds have an everyday memory of Armenians, whether it is a particular
house or a building or a field,” he said in the car. “The memory is
still there.”
Sarafian didn’t know the way, but
at a courthouse we found someone who could guide us: İkram Sevim, a law
clerk, tall and thin, in a checkered blazer. As we drove past a village
built on an Armenian graveyard, Sevim spoke of 1915: “The Armenians
taken away were saying, ‘We have animals up on the mountain, and if you
don’t milk them then the animals will suffer.’ We didn’t say anything.
They were looking after their animals, and we were not looking after
them.”
Ten minutes later, we were in empty
hills, the grass vibrant. A sign marked a military outpost: “Special
Security Zone—Entrance Forbidden.” Sevim drove briskly past, turning
right, then left, until the paved road gave way to a network of rutted
tracks. Stones on the road grew larger and sharper. Fearing that they
would puncture his tires, Sevim did not want to proceed. But we went on
in Sarafian’s car, driving no faster than a stroll, while a few of us,
in front of the vehicle, chucked large rocks out of the way. Still, it
was evident that we wouldn’t reach the ravine before nightfall.
The
sky faded to the color of slate. Looking at a jagged hilltop before
us—a scrim blocking the river—I thought of a moment in the Armenian
liturgy when the priests step behind a curtain to prepare the Eucharist.
On the other side, churchgoers can hear chants and singing, but the
ritual is obscured, in a symbol of faith. Had we made it to the other
side of the outcropping, what would we have seen? The Tigris flowing, as
always, with no hint of the violent history attached to that spot. As
we carefully turned around, I decided that where we stood was as good
as anywhere. Then someone made a joke about the military outpost and
what we might say if we were stopped—the truth would raise too many
suspicions—and I realized that I was only concocting a justification for
failing to reach a place of real importance. There is, perhaps, an
element of contrivance in any pilgrimage—the idea that arriving at a
far-off destination will be personally transformative. But we were not
attempting a pilgrimage in the conventional sense. We were hoping to
transform our destination, to employ our presence as witnesses, even if a century too late, to raise it out of officially imposed obscurity.
In
the car, Sarafian mentioned that he was planning an event in Diyarbakir
the following day, and then he had to rush to Paris for an academic
conference. But he intended to return. A dam was being built downstream,
he said, and by the time it was finished the site would be flooded, its
erasure complete. Local memory of the event was also vanishing. During
his earlier trip, he had met an eighty-three-year-old village leader
named Hussein Karakuş, whose uncle had participated in the slaughter at
the ravine. The story of the keleks had been told and retold in his
family, and Sarafian, with his phone, recorded Karakuş as he relayed
what he knew: the Armenians had been sent down the river from Diyarbakir
by keleks on the vali’s order, and they “were all
killed and burned.” When Sarafian asked if there had been any Armenians
in the area, the man began to list dozens of villages—Keferzo, Bazboot,
Deri, Tmiz, Baraso—that had been emptied of inhabitants. “They were all
massacred,” he said, and added, “It was a sin.” Sarafian promised to
return, but Karakuş died shortly after their meeting, taking with him
whatever else he knew.
On
the road back to Diyarbakir, I dozed, then awoke. Rain hit the window
in diagonals. My thoughts turned to my grandfather. The more I learned
about his survival, the more precarious it seemed. Most of the survivor
stories I had heard from Armenians in Diyarbakir were of
children—orphaned, or spared with their mothers—who were taken in by
Turks or Kurds. My grandfather had survived as an adult, relatively
openly, sheltering other Armenians in a way that doesn’t seem to have
been completely disguised.
Perhaps
he was not prominent enough to be put on the keleks and robbed, as the
city’s wealthiest Armenians were. But he had not been deported and
killed on a roadside, either. Certainly, he had useful skills. In a
telegram, Reşid reported that two hundred Armenian craftsmen had been
allowed to remain in the province, because they were valuable to the
military. My grandfather, as far as I was able to learn, never made
things for the Army. But my father and his siblings say that he provided
Western garments to members of the city’s Kurdish and Turkish élite,
even as they were planning the massacres. In essence, he was bartering
for his life.
There is a story that all my
grandfather’s living children recall: as the killings and deportations
were winding down, he received an unwanted invitation from the vali himself. He was brought before him, and the vali
asked, Why are you still alive? When my grandfather explained that he
was a master tailor, someone produced a bolt of fabric. Make me a coat,
the vali said. My grandfather saw that there was not enough
fabric, but, realizing that he could not refuse, he took it home and
proclaimed that the family would live or die by this coat. He worked
desperately. When the coat was finished, he brought it to the vali, who tried it on and said that it was good—but then, just as my grandfather was leaving, the vali
called out, “Wait! I would like these buttons to be covered in fabric,
too.” My grandparents struggled to cover the buttons, using whatever
scraps were left. Then my grandfather returned with the coat, and he was
spared.
The story has the contours of a
parable; some details may have been burnished in the retelling. But on
the whole it appears to match the historical record. As a young
revolutionary, Reşid was arrested by the sultan’s men, and in his
memoirs he gave special attention to the treatment of his clothes,
bemoaning their confiscation and mocking their replacements: “a fez on
my head that was rather narrow and too long” and “a pair of pants that
still sagged even though I had folded the waist three times (they must
have been tailored for one of the palace eunuchs).” Reşid understood
from experience how small indignities could be used as an instrument of
persecution. A
historian who spent years studying the extirpation of Diyarbakir’s
Armenians told me, “It is highly unlikely that anybody not entirely
reliable was ever allowed to get close to Reşid and take his
measurements.” Ghusein, the author of “Martyred Armenia,” recalled that
Reşid retained a few Armenian craftsmen in Diyarbakir, but he suggested
that there were other forms of patronage, too. “The last family deported
from Diyarbakir was that of Dunjian, about November, 1915,” he wrote.
“This family was protected by certain Notables.” Our family, it seems,
was the same.
My grandfather knew mufti İbrahim
and the members of his clan, prominent local Kurds who belonged to
Reşid’s inner circle. In particular, he associated with the mufti’s son,
Şeref—a man one diplomat listed as No. 12 under “Persons Responsible
for the Armenian Massacres in the Vilayet of Diyarbakir.” From
conversations with my father, I came to regard their relationship as a
matter of cold convenience. After the war, Şeref often visited the
family home, and my father told me that pleasantries were exchanged,
that children were expected to kiss his hand, and that my grandfather
often muttered a mild curse after he left. But not long ago my mother
found an old tape of my father’s eldest living sister, Ani, interviewed
by my parents, and she talked with my father about Şeref:
ANI: He was a kind man.
PUZANT: He was not that kind.
ANI: Yes, Father did say that from appearances he seemed kind, but if the opportunity arose he was still a Turk.
PUZANT: He wasn’t that good. He was a very bad man, but among bad men he was good.
ANI: He didn’t do anything bad to my father.
My
aunt was the second daughter in the family to be named Ani. In 1915, at
the height of the genocide, my grandmother gave birth to her first
child, and named her Ani, but she died young. The next child, born in
1916, inherited her name. “I asked my father, ‘How did I get my name?’ ”
my aunt said on the tape. “And he told me it was given by Şeref bey,
who said, ‘You know, your people are fighting at the front, and it’s
possible that you might get the Kars-Ardahan provinces back, and also
the ancient city of Ani, so you should call your daughter Ani.’ And so
when Ani died the name was left for me.”
This
is not cold convenience. Perhaps it is impossible to fully grasp the
mixture of friendship and animosity, suspicion and mistrust between my
grandfather and the mufti’s son—the complexities of a relationship that
transcended not only communal and religious differences but also the
rift of genocide. In 1915, Şeref had a secret knock for my grandfather’s
door, and on at least one occasion warned him that the house was under
suspicion as a sanctuary. My grandfather sent away the people who were
hiding there, some of the men disguised in women’s veils. Searchers came
with dogs, but found nothing. Why Şeref decided to help, risking his
own life, is hard to know. Just before leaving Diyarbakir, my
grandfather asked him. Şeref said, “The Russians were advancing. They
had reached as far as Erzerum. Had they made it to Diyarbakir, then I
would have been like you. In that case, you would have protected me.”
As
it turned out, Şeref’s fears were misplaced. In Diyarbakir, many people
involved in the genocide remained prominent in local life. Şeref became
mayor. Another member of his clan, who had been key to the genocidal
program, entered parliament. And the vali? He was unrepentant.
The C.U.P. party secretary recalled saying to him later, “You are a
doctor. And, being a doctor, you are charged with saving lives, so how
is it that you let so many innocent people go to their death?” Reşid
described a condition of existential threat: “I saw that my country was
going to be lost. So, eyes closed, I pushed on ahead without fear,
convinced it was for the good of my nation.” A bit later, he added, “You
asked me how, being a doctor, I could have taken a life. Well, here is
my answer: Those Armenian bandits were a bunch of harmful microbes
pestering the body of this nation. A doctor’s duty is to kill microbes,
isn’t it?” Reşid
was ready to be judged, he boasted: “If, because of my actions, my own
country’s history holds me responsible, then so be it.” At the war’s
end, in 1918, he was arrested, and prosecuted by an Ottoman tribunal,
which operated briefly under foreign pressure. But he fled detention,
and while the authorities tried to hunt him down he wrote a rambling
letter to his wife. “The Armenian hounds have joined them,” he said.
Friends advised him to turn himself in, but he chastised them. “I feel
the result will be dark. I am thinking of committing suicide.” He armed
himself with a revolver, and in February, 1919, he killed himself. His
family was granted a state stipend—for “services to the fatherland”—and,
in time, Turkish society came to honor him: a street in central Ankara
still bears his name.
After
the war, my grandfather strove to navigate a city that remained in
turmoil. In 1925, a Kurdish rebellion was crushed, its leaders executed
by hanging in the city center. Four years later, my grandfather said, of
his eldest daughters, “These girls have to leave.” He smuggled them and
one of his sons to Aleppo. He, too, was desperate to go. At one point,
he sold his house and all his belongings, and moved the family into a
small apartment, waiting for permits that would allow them to leave. But
the permits never came. There were other attempts, also unsuccessful.
My aunt told me that a friend of his, a Turkish official, looked up his
records and told him that he would never get permission: “You are
supposed to stay here and work.” The city’s entrepreneurial class had
been wiped out.
My grandfather went into
business with one of the “notables,” a prominent member of the clan that
had helped protect him. He also opened a sesame-oil factory, and he did
well. In his quiet way, he continued to help people; my Aunt Ani said
he was an “anonymous philanthropist,” adding, “Everyone called him dayi”—uncle.
But, outside his family, I sense, he kept himself at some remove. In
his home, he permitted only Armenian to be spoken, and yet he forbade
himself and his family to speak it on the streets. Though he liked to
wear expensive clothes, he always had his children trample on them
before he went out. Conspicuousness was still a risk. When he learned
that another of his sons was secretly planning to go, he helped him. One
of his daughters visited from Aleppo; he brought her a Ramadan sweet
wrapped in paper and told her that if she could guess what it was he
would give her anything. When she guessed correctly, she asked to take
one of her brothers with her, and he obliged.
Even
as his family emigrated in waves, my grandfather prospered, moving
closer to the Great Mosque (and farther from the Infidel District). By
the time my father was born, in 1936, he had built a grand house, with a
stable facing the avenue, a courtyard, and a flat roof in the
Diyarbakir style. In those years, during the intense Anatolian summer
heat, just about the entire city would retreat to the rooftops at night,
to wooden daybeds open to the night sky. My grandfather’s house had
them, too. But my family’s stories of life in that house give the sense
that a century of modernity moved there at an accelerated pace. My
father recalls going from meals on a carpet, in the Near Eastern style,
to Western dining, with table, chairs, and china; my grandmother
returning from Aleppo with nylons. There was a new camera, and a small
darkroom to go with it. In
an old suitcase crammed with pictures, I found a photo taken in that
house; on the back, my mother had written, “circa 1950.” My grandfather,
near seventy, is at the center: hair short, neatly combed, pure white;
tie in a crisp knot. He is surrounded by thirty people, pressed tightly
together. Looking at that picture, it is possible to see that the house
was intended to accommodate generations, and yet, only a year or two
later, my grandfather would abandon it: a train for Syria, forged
papers, a ship for Beirut.
In exile, he
succumbed to a medley of ailments: prostate surgery, a leg lost to
gangrene, gathering isolation. He lived to see one son die in a car
accident and another shot while standing on the balcony—a stray bullet
from one of Beirut’s warring factions proving fatal. My grandfather
spent his final years bedridden in his Beirut apartment. The family’s
money was nearly gone; his last words to my father, who left for America
in 1958, were a request for a wooden leg. Death arrived before the
request could be fulfilled. He was buried in an unmarked grave. My
father had told me his childhood address, 2 Çiçek Street, and before
leaving Diyarbakir I went to search for it. In a narrow cobblestoned
alley, I found the number sloppily painted on an apartment building made
of brick, crumbling mortar, and rebar. The street was about the width
of a man standing with arms stretched apart, and the buildings were
covered in graffiti honoring the P.K.K. Kurdish children played
unattended. Since 1990, countless villages had been razed, and the
villagers who came to Diyarbakir had put up buildings rapidly to exploit
legal loopholes. The buildings were called gecekondu, Demirbaş told me, meaning “built in the night.” The structure at 2 Çiçek Street looked to me like a variant of gecekondu,
and I imagined that in ten years it, too, would be torn down and
replaced. The only discernible remnant of our family house was a heavy
stone that once served as a threshold.
III. REMEMBRANCE
State-sponsored
denial is not a void, a simple absence of truth; it is a wounding
instrument. And, after a hundred years of it, it is hard to feel
Armenian in a meaningful way without defining oneself in opposition to
it. But the centenary of the genocide, in 2015, may be more than just an
occasion for reflection. Some anniversaries offer the promise of
release, and the historical distance, combined with the changes
unfolding in liberal Turkish society, may be significant. “This
government has an unusual aspect to it,” Demirbaş told me, sitting in
Sourp Giragos’s courtyard. “It punishes us, but it also implements our
projects. I was dismissed as mayor for providing multilingual municipal
services, but then the state started multilingual TV programming.” As we
spoke, a reporter rushed over to ask if anyone had heard about
Erdoğan’s “apology” for 1915. As it turned out, Erdoğan did not
apologize. He offered a perplexing statement—sympathetic in tone but in
its substance still consistent with the official denial. He said, “It is
a duty of humanity to acknowledge that Armenians remember the suffering
of that period, just like every other citizen of the Ottoman empire.” A
week later, he argued in an interview that the genocide never happened,
echoing a sentiment that he expressed before the reconstruction of the
cathedral: “If there is a crime, then those who committed it can offer
an apology. My nation, my country, has no such issue.”
On
April 24th, the Day of Remembrance, I went to Sourp Giragos early in
the morning to see who would turn up. The church door was padlocked, but
a few people arrived and sat down for tea. There was a man from
Istanbul who spoke about his grandfather, who had owned three-quarters
of a village nearby. The man asked if the church had kept land
registers; it had, but most of them had long since disappeared. Five or
six years ago, he said, he had told a lawyer friend that he wanted to
sue the state to reclaim his family’s land, but the lawyer advised
against it: two families who sued had disappeared. “Things are
changing,” someone said. “Yes,” the man said. “But if you have a hundred
years’ worth of fear in you, it’s hard to change from one day to the
next.”
While
he was talking, another man arrived and sat down, a man in his forties
or fifties, with dark hair, a thick mustache, a sad and uncertain
bearing. Later, someone told me that his name was Abbas Ercan. In a deep
voice, he poured out a flood of loosely consecutive memories. His
grandfather had survived the massacres, he began to say, but just as he
began to speak he had to stop, and, after a small gasp, he wept. A woman
at the table comforted him: Yes, yes, she said, we have all cried over
things like this. Ercan resumed his story, about how his grandfather and
great-aunt had been orphaned, how they were taken in by neighbors, how
they earned money cleaning wool, working a loom, dyeing cloth. But, as
he continued, it became clear that the source of all that emotion was
not so much the difficulty of surviving 1915 but the difficulty of
surviving the denial. Decades later, he said, during the Second World
War, his grandfather—a Muslim convert named Ahmet—was bathing alone in a
river when some people stumbled upon him and asked, “What are you
doing?” Ahmet explained that he was performing Muslim ablutions, but the
visitors took one look at him and said, “No, no, we know who you
are”—by which they meant that they knew he was Armenian. Ahmet was
overcome with terror, thinking, Oh, God, they’re going to eliminate me
right now. Ercan
began to choke up again, but he continued, explaining that the people
who had found Ahmet understood his fear. They told him, “We are like
you,” meaning they were also Armenian, and they all promised to stay in
touch, but they never did.
Ercan emphasized that
he held no grudge against anyone, that he simply had come that morning
to do something he could not do for most of his life: to speak about who
he was and about his family’s experience. I could see that for this man
April 24th was not so much about commemorating the past as it was about
finding some release from the present. He was likely Muslim, but for
him Sourp Giragos was an enclave beyond the denial. “Every morning, my
grandfather, without exception, would go and pray at the mosque, even if
he was the only person there,” Ercan said. “What he was probably doing
was saying to himself, ‘If something like this ever happens again, I
want the community to say, “No, no, no, Ahmet was a good Muslim—even if
he is a convert, he is a good Muslim, anyway.” ’ So they wouldn’t hurt
him. I am not exactly sure how much he believed.” Someone said that this
was a common trait among converts, that they become zealous to
demonstrate their faith. “They figure something would happen to them if
they talked,” Ercan added. “But we don’t hold a grudge,” he said again.
“We only want one thing: when we meet someone who has been through all
this, we want to console one another.”
That
evening, Ara Sarafian wanted to visit the ruins of another, far older
church, called Sourp Sarkis. It was a short walk, but we got lost,
taking one turn, then another, through narrow alleys where old women sat
on doorsteps.
“Do you know where the old church is?”
“The mosque?”
“No, the church. It’s a ruin.”
Eventually,
we found the church compound. The gate was locked, so I followed
Sarafian through a hole in the outer wall. Inside, a family had
improvised a simple house beside the ruin. Across the entrance, they had
strung up a nylon rope for laundry. The scene reminded me of what Sourp
Giragos had looked like years ago. The roof had collapsed, but a
network of stone arches supported by pillars remained. Because the
church had been used to store rice, a third of it had been walled off in
cinder block. Dirt and grass filled the basilica, pretty much wall to
wall. The floor appeared to undulate like sea swells, with the fallen
basalt rocks floating among them. As we fanned out, a freckled Kurdish
woman emerged from the house with her children. Sarafian spoke with her.
She was in her twenties. Her husband was in prison.
Like
Sourp Giragos, this church had endured cycles of collapse and rebirth:
in 1915, a treasured relic—a fragment of a nail, supposedly among those
hammered into Jesus’ Cross—went missing. “This is the reality of the
Armenian genocide,” Sarafian said. “Sourp Giragos represents a future
wish.” He studied the fallen architecture, and then left, making his way
back through the hole in the wall. I decided to linger. Four
generations ago—decades before my grandfather was born—a member of my
grandmother’s family, Sarkis Kazanjian, had been at that church, helping
to renovate it. He is the earliest identifiable person in our family
tree; beyond him, our ties to Diyarbakir vanish into black earth.
As
I walked across the ruins, it occurred to me that, though Kazanjian had
not lived to see 1915, he had been touched by it, too. This is one of
the strange features of genocide denial and of Turkification: erasure,
by design, works both forward and backward in time. My grandfather had
preserved the future for his family. But his past, our past, whatever
contributions we had made to Ottoman society, had been effectively
eradicated. I had been travelling with family photos, showing them to
people, and the photo of Kazanjian always evoked the strongest reaction.
The picture is of a broad-shouldered man with intense eyes, wearing a
fez, vest, coat, and embroidered caftan. Kazanjian was a merchant,
apparently also with a role in officialdom. A Kurdish intellectual, a
good friend of Hrant Dink, wept when she saw it, and when I asked her
why, she didn’t answer. I could speculate. There was no way to look at
such a man and believe that he belonged to any other part of the world,
and yet it was also obvious that in Turkey, whatever progress had been
made in the past century, this man, and many others like him, could not
be offered acceptance without painful complications. As
a boy working to restore the church, Kazanjian had caught his hand
between two stones and lost a finger. If you knew the right piece of
basalt, you could reach out and touch it, but there was no way to know.
My aunt said the finger had been buried beneath one of the altars: he
had lost it in an act of piety, and it was given a pious resting place.
The story had its uncertainties, but memory—kept alive now by only a
few—was all that was left.
I went farther into
the church, making a list of the things that the people of Diyarbakir
had left there. Dried scraps of bread. Automotive carpeting. An old
shoe. A fragment of a transistor radio. Corrugated plastic, some of it
burned. Where the main altar had been, there was a fire pit; among the
ashes, a wrapper for a candy called Coco Fino and empty cans of Efes
beer. A rusted wire. Coils of shit. In the inset of a wall, someone had
arranged several stones in a neat line. Hundreds of daisies reached
upward. And as the sun descended behind the high city walls the smell of
grilled meat drifted over from nearby homes, and the sound of children
playing began to fill the streets. A ball was kicked and it hit the side
of a building and bounced. Some boys clambered over the wall that
surrounded the church. Women left their kitchens, and climbed to their
roofs to collect carpets that had been put out to air. TVs wired to
satellite dishes came on, filling spare rooms with their ethereal glow.
All of Diyarbakir, it seemed, except the church, drifted forward in
time. Overhead, a flock of common swifts darted and circled among the
old stone arches. Their black wings arced like boomerangs as they
swooped through the ruins—above the piles of earth, the weeds and the
wildflowers, all the trash—and their movements were ceaseless, careless,
as if unweighted by anything. ♦
Raffi Khatchadourian became a staff writer at The New Yorker in 2008.
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